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Merchant Law in a Modern Economy

(Forthcoming in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW,
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS)
Lisa Bernstein *
Introduction
The Uniform Commercial Code (“Code”), the statute that governs
transactions in the sale of goods in the United States, adopts a highly
legal realist jurisprudential approach that gives great weight to context,
applies a lax parol evidence rule, and looks to usage of trade, course of
performance, and course of dealing to interpret contracts, fill contractual
gaps, imply warranties, modify agreements, waive obligations, and give
meaning to many of the Code’s own standard like default rules. This
adjudicative approach (with some nuanced variations) has been widely
adopted the world over. It is at the heart of many continental legal
systems as well as the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods and the recently proposed Common European Sales Law.
The Code’s contextualized adjudicative approach was designed
to provide a set of off-the-rack contract default rules that would
“simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions.” i By directing courts to look to trade practices and the
contracting context to give meaning to both parties’ agreements and the
Code’s standard-like defaults, the Code’s drafters sought to provide
defaults that would, by virtue of their reflection of the contracting
context, be better tailored to parties’ transactional needs than any
possible set of clear and definite rules designed to apply across a wide
range of transaction types. In adopting this approach, the drafters also
sought to create a semi-permanent piece of legislation. A piece of
legislation that when applied by courts in a purposeful way that took
account of its reason would “provide its own machinery for the
expansion of commercial practices . . . through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties” thereby ensuring that the Code could adapt
itself to “unforeseen and new circumstances and practices” ii without the
need for legislative amendments.
This essay explores the Code’s adjudicative architecture from
both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Its goal is to assess
whether the Code will be able to successfully adapt American
commercial law to meet the challenges created by the structural changes
in the American economy that have taken place over the past twenty
years.
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The essay begins by exploring the best available evidence on the
validity of the empirical assumptions that are central to the Code’s
jurisprudential approach and its machinery for adapting to change. The
primary focus is on the assumptions that unwritten usages of trade that
are widely known across the relevant geographic boundaries of trade
exist, that these usages can found by courts, and that contextualized
adjudication is a majoritarian default rule from the perspective of
business transactors.
After presenting empirical evidence that suggests that the truth of
these assumptions is questionable at best, the essay draws on arguments
developed by neo-formalist scholars to explore the reasons that the
Code’s adjudicative approach is ill-suited to transactions between both
merchants and sophisticated business entities. It begins by suggesting
that the Code prevents transactors from contracting using their
preferred mix of legal and extra legal terms, impedes the very types of
flexible work-a-day contractual relationships it was designed to
encourage, and encourages certain types of strategic behavior. It then
suggests that in transactions between large multi-agent entities, the
Code’s contextualist interpretive approach imposes significant
additional costs on business transactors: it creates or exacerbates intrafirm agency costs, increases both information transmittal costs and
operating costs, and leads parties to use complex transactional structures
that they could more easily forgo if the law gave primacy to the terms of
their written agreements and adopted a more formalistic adjudicative
approach. In addition, and of increasing importance to the modern
economy, the Code’s adjudicative approach makes what scholars have
termed “contracting for innovation” iii more expensive and difficult than
it would be in a more formalist, agreement-centric, interpretive regime.
The essay concludes that given fundamental changes in the
American economy and the structure and operation of firms that have
occurred over the past two decades, it is very unlikely that the Code will
be able to successfully adapt to the demands of the modern economy.
Rather, for sales law to successfully respond to these changes, reformers
will need to rethink commercial law from the ground up. They will need
to recognize that recent changes in the structure, organization and
operation of large multi-agent firms pose contract governance challenges
that cannot be adequately met through a contextualist approach to
adjudication that relies on the gradual evolution of usages and practices
to respond to economic change. The complexity of modern contractual
relationships together with the high levels of coordination and
innovation (both inside and outside of the firm) that are needed for
economic success, suggest that written contracts that are interpreted as
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written will (except when the parties specify otherwise) provide
businesses, and by implication markets, with a faster and more tailored
way of responding to economic change, than will the continued
incorporation of usages and practices, especially in light of changes in
the technology of contracting.
I. The Empirical Basis of the Code’s Jurisprudential Architecture
The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted by Karl Llewellyn,
one of the leading legal realists of his time and an outspoken advocate of
the social scientific approach to law making. Llewellyn sought to draft a
statute whose rules were “designed to adapt rules of law to the way that
business is actually carried on,” iv and that drew on “the practices of
businessmen and business houses [as] important factors in construing
their contracts and actions and in determining their rights and
liabilities.” v Given this goal it is tempting to assume that the Code’s
assumptions about the business/merchant world and merchant
preferences were based on solid empirical evidence. However, as a
leading historian of the Code creation process concluded, “it must be
conceded that there was virtually no systematic project research of the
kind postulated by the scientific method. There were no orderly research
designs, disciplined sampling or carefully tested questionnaires.” vi In
drafting the Code, Llewellyn relied primarily on his knowledge of the
medieval Law Merchant, vii
his own business intuitions and
conversations with bankers and lawyers.viii ”Such fieldwork as was done
tended to be adhoc.” ix
Llewellyn’s failure to conduct social scientific research to inform
the Code drafting project has long been dismissed by his supporters
who claim that despite his methodological lapses, “critics who have
been suspicious of his alleged ‘unscientific’ ‘impressionistic’ or
‘anecdotal’ approach to facts have yet to point to any major factual
assumptions of the code that were misleading or inaccurate.” x In recent
years, however, an increasing body of historical and empirical evidence
has begun to raise serious questions about the soundness of the Code’s
empirical assumptions. This section draws on the best (though limited)
historical and empirical evidence available to explore whether usages of
trade actually exist in merchant communities, whether courts can
determine the existence and content of usages with reasonable accuracy,
and finally, whether there is any reason to question the widely shared
assumption that contextualist adjudication is a majoritarian default rule.
A. Do Usages of Trade Exist?
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1. The Law Merchant
A fundamental starting point for defenders of the proposition that
meaningful merchant customs and usages exist is the history of the socalled medieval Law Merchant of sales. According to the accounts of the
Law Merchant relied upon by Llewellyn, xi during the Middle Ages
supra-local transactions in the sale of goods were governed by unwritten
customs of trade that were widely known, widely followed, and used by
merchant arbitrators to decide cases in specialized merchant courts that
operated wholly outside of the purview of the state. This image of the
operation of the Law Merchant had a powerful effect on Llewellyn’s
thinking. In fact, early drafts of the Code, provided for “mercantile facts,”
including trade usages and commercial practices, to be found by panels
of merchant experts. xii More generally, as one of Llewellyn’s assistants in
the Code drafting process explained, “[i]t is fair to say that the
draftsmen of the Code. . .wanted to correct some false starts . . .and to
restore the law merchant as an institution for growth only lightly kept in
bounds by statute.” xiii
Although Llewellyn relied heavily on the history of the Law
Merchant in drafting the Code, recent historical scholarship casts doubt
on the claim that medieval law merchant—in the sense of a generally
accepted set of unwritten sales related customs—actually existed. xiv
Indeed the account of its operation that Llewellyn himself relied on (that
of Levin Goldschmit) has been largely discredited, xv and recent research
on medieval commerce has concluded that “we lack evidence that [salesrelated gap filling customs] became a uniform and universal part of the
lex mercatoria other than, perhaps, at a very high level of
generality. Instead, the evidence suggests that substantive customs
remained geographically local or confined to a particular network of
repeat players.” xvi To the extent that robust commercial customs existed
in the Middle Ages, they were not part of “sales” law, but rather dealt
with bills of exchange. Yet even in this area, usages did not emerge
through the evolution of unwritten practices and understandings.
Rather, they emerged through the repeated use of written standard form
contracts and the emergence of transactional intermediaries like notaries.
As a consequence, the history of the so-called medieval law merchant of
negotiable instruments cannot be said to provide empirical evidence that
the types of unwritten usages of trade that the Code relies on so
extensively actually existed in the Middle Ages. It does, however,
illustrate the power of written agreements to support trade and
introduce contractual innovations, even in an environment where both
writing and transmitting a writing were more time-consuming and
expensive then they are today.

4

2. Trade Association Codification Attempts at the Turn of the 20th Century
In an effort to conduct the type of social scientific studies that
Llewellyn might have conducted had he applied his ideas about social
science research to the Code drafting project, one study looked at the
efforts of trade associations in four merchant industries—grain, feed,
hay, textiles and silk to codify their customs into written trade rules in
the 50 years prior to the start of the Code project. xvii All of the industries
studied were ones where the preconditions for the emergence of
customs were met-- transactors interacted on a repeat basis in relatively
similar transactions over a long period of time. Nevertheless, the debates
leading up to the adoption of these rules revealed that transactors did
not agree about the meaning of even very common trade terms and that
there was no consensus about the ways that common aspects of business
were generally conducted.
In the hay industry for example, before the first set of national
trading rules was adopted the “packaging, shipping and handling [of]
hay was an irregular business. There were no established customs to
govern, and every transaction was typical of the parties engaged in
it.” xviii Transactors did not even agree about the meaning of the term
“bale” of hay, for “the large bales of New York and New England means
a different bale from the large bale in the Western States.” xix Even within
local areas no uniform definitions emerged. As participants at the fourth
convention of the National Hay Association discovered, “in Chicago at
present there is a lack of definition of small bales.” xx Attempts to
develop rules on the reasonable time for payment of various fees also
led to contentious debate. As one participant in the debate aptly
observed, “that reasonable time business will not [tell you] anything.
You might as well leave it out.” xxi
Disagreement about the meaning of terms and the content of
usages was also rampant in the grain industry. Shortly before the rules
drafting process began the trade press concluded that “there are customs
in the grain trade that are supported to be established, but the trouble in
respect to them is, [that] they are not fixed, [and] are not understood
alike, some understand them in one way and other in another way, and
for that reason, if for no other [they] cause difficulty.” xxii The national
grain rules were adopted in 1902 after only a two year drafting process.
However, it took much longer for them to supplant the rules of local
associations. As late as 1928, the chairman of the national rules
committee observed that “uniformity in the rules is a matter of slow
growth as the different markets are very conservative in making changes
in rules of years standing” xxiii
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In the textile and silk industries, the disagreements about the
content of customs were even more significant and the debates over the
creation of rules were even more heated. This is not surprising because
the rules in these groups did not govern transactions between merchants
who were buyers one day and sellers the next, but rather transactions
between merchants who played a fixed role in the chain of production
and distribution and therefore had industry-segment level interests.
The drafting of the textile rules, known as the Worth Street Rules,
“was fraught with conflict, involved negotiation among numerous trade
associations,” xxiv and took 18 years to complete. Consensus was so
difficult to achieve that the drafting committee ultimately decided to
create several different sets of codified customs for different segments of
the industry; yet even with this high degree of particularization, many
terms remained uncodified since a consensus on their meaning could
not be reached. In the silk industry, the creation of rules was equally
hard fought and, as in textiles, many different sets of rules governing
different stages in the chain of production and distribution were
adopted. Interestingly, silkmen did not revere usages. As one silkman
put it “huge question marks are boldly inscribed on the walls of custom,
hoary with age, and covered with the ivy of reverence.” xxv And, as one
of the association’s annual reports explained, silkmaen were reluctant to
codify usages because “when a business routine is established in an
organization it often requires . . .a so-called shake up to introduce
innovations.” xxvi
Eventually, each of these industries shifted their efforts from
codifying customs, to negotiating agreed meanings of common terms
(frequently in ways that revealed a desire to change not to harmonize
local meanings). xxvii Although the trade rules they adopted might have
been loosely informed by practices prevailing in different parts of the
country, they were not mere codifications of common understandings.
The process by which they were drafted and adopted was quasilegislative in nature. Rules drafting committees actively sought to
consider practice and policy considerations so as to better promote trade.
As the by-laws of these associations and other trade associations made
clear, their goal was to “promote uniformity” of practices and “to seek
certainty in usages,” all in an effort to avoid “misunderstandings.” xxviii
Some critics have characterized these studies as “highly
controversial.” xxix They have variously argued that the individual case
studies of particular industries do not shed light on the contracting
preferences of businesses in general; xxx that the period chosen for study
had not given transnational usages long enough to evolve;xxxi and that
evidence from the turn of the nineteenth century is of little importance
6

today. xxxii Critics also point out that even if usages are uncommon,
evidentiary rules provide sufficient protection against courts looking to
non-existent unwritten usages. xxxiii
The first of these objections is certainly true. Extreme caution is
always warranted when extrapolating from case studies. However, it is
notable that the contextualists have not identified any studies that
contradict the findings of the case studies discussed here. Rather, they
justify their positions by reference to the “pre-theoretical empirical
presumption that widespread, identifiable, and effective commercial
practices do exist,” xxxiv and by proffering ad hoc examples like the fact
that a 2x4 is not a board measuring two inches by four inches. xxxv It is,
however, unclear what a “pre-theoretical empirical assumption” is, and
as discussed further below, the example of the 2x4 actually undermines
the claim that unwritten usages that are coextensive with the extent of
trade (or important and delineated subsets of it) evolve over time and
coalesce into workable trading norms in merchant communities.
During the last decades of the 1800s, as trade in lumber became
national in scope, lumber industry participants soon realized that there
were different understandings of lumber size and grading designations
in different parts of the country, and even within some local areas.xxxvi
These differences led to many disputes, and were viewed by lumbermen
as a major impediment to trade; yet by the early 1920s no consensus on
the meaning of lumber size and grade designations had emerged.
Lumber dealers widely agreed that the term 2x4 did not mean a board
that measures two inches by four inches, but there was no consensus
about the actual dimensions that a board described as a 2x4 should have.
For example, the Northern Pine Manufacturers Association defined a
2x4 as measuring 1-5/8 x 3-5/8, while the North Carolina Pine
Association defined it as 1-3/4 x 3-3/4. xxxvii
When an industry wide definition finally emerged (which even
today is different for dry and green lumber) xxxviii, it came about through
a quasi-legislative effort, rather than through the evolution of customary
practices. In 1919, under the sponsorship of the Commerce
Department, xxxix lumber associations representing different regions of
the country and segments of the industry negotiated and codified
definitions of the 2x4 and other common size designations. In the course
of their deliberations these groups did look at the prevalence of different
meanings across the country, xl many of which had already been codified
by regional associations, local associations, and individual sawmills. Yet
they also took into account the functional uses to which boards of
different sizes were commonly put, and tailored the definitions they
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adopted to reflect the minimum engineering standards needed to
accomplish these various ends. xli
Today, the meaning of 2x4 and other common lumber size
designations is codified in a voluntary product standard put out by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. In sum, the history of
the 2x4 suggests that it is a poor example of an unwritten and generally
understood trade usage that emerged overtime through informal
evolving industry consensus.
The second objection to the case studies is that at the time the
codification efforts began the industries studied had not been national
for long enough for customs to evolve. This objection is difficult to
evaluate as critics do not put forth any metric for assessing the expected
pace of customary evolution. However, the grain trade had been
national in scope for over 60 years before the first trade rules were
adopted, xlii and the hay trade had been inter-regional and at least
partially national 30 years before the rules codification process even
began. xliii Even more strikingly, important parts of the American textile
trade were centered in New York for over 300 years before the process of
creating trading rules even began. Indeed, they were concentrated on
Worth Street itself for 75 years prior to the adoption of the Worth Street
Trading Rules. xliv Similarly, the American silk industry had been
centered in the northeast since the mid 1840’s with a significant
concentration of silkmen in New York and Patterson, New Jersey. These
silkmen met with one another on a regular basis and also formed a
variety of clubs and associations to further their business interests. xlv The
industry was thus organized into meaningful groups/associations for
over fifty years before the Silk Association of America’s trade rule
codification process even began.
In light of these facts, the claim that the codification efforts began
before national--or in the cases of textiles and silk, local--customs had
had sufficient time to develop, cannot provide a plausible account of the
lack of agreement on the meaning of terms that everyone acknowledged
were in wide spread use. Regardless, the important point for commercial
law and commercial law reform is that even if usages might have
emerged in the long-run, however defined, usages had not evolved
quickly enough to meet the needs of commerce. Otherwise codification,
an expensive and time consuming enterprise would not have been
needed.
Finally, in assessing the relevance of the case studies to
contemporary commerce, it is important to note that the conditions for
the emergence of usages were more nearly met in the contexts studied
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than they are in most industries today. Although the studies do not (and
do not purport to) prove that usages do not exist today, their evidence is
powerful enough to suggest that those who continue to advocate
incorporating trade usages into commercial contracts should be moved
to provide proof of their existence.
3. Usage in the Contemporary Texas Cattle Feed Market
In a follow up to the case studies discussed above, and to begin to
explore whether usages exist in modern merchant industries, a pilot case
study of transactional practices in the contemporary cattle feed market
in and around Amarillo Texas was conducted. xlvi This market is
characterized by the preconditions typically associated with the
emergence of well-developed trade usages. Most transactors have
relatively few trading partners xlvii and most of their contracting
relationships are long-standing and repeat. xlviii Most transactions take
place in a geographically limited area characterized by a high degree of
social and ethnic homogeneity.xlix The firms surveyed were mostly wellestablished market participants. l All were members of either the Texas
Grain and Feed Association, an organization that runs the private legal
system that governs transactions in this market, or the Texas Cattle
Feeders Association, an association of feedlot owners and feed brokers,
who view themselves as being part of a close-knit group. li As a
consequence, the entities studied were quite likely to be well versed in
any trade usages that were indeed widely followed; yet the study found
that even under these near ideal conditions, unwritten work-a-day
practices varied widely with respect to aspects of exchange where the
Code would look to usage to give meaning its own standard like default
rules.
For example, transactors widely (though not universally) agreed that
giving a grace period for payment was appropriate,lii yet they did not
agree on the proper length of the grace period which differed for new
and old transactors. liii Moreover not a single respondent indicated that
they would determine the appropriate grace period by an industry norm
or practice. Most of those who commented on the subject indicated that
their actions would be determined by the identity of their contracting
partner and the reason for the delay.liv Transactors were also split about
how frequently they would accept nonconforming tender with a price
adjustment, lv and how that price adjustment was to be determined—
some thought it should be individually negotiated while others thought
that it should be determined on the basis of a regional scale of discounts,
or a local scale of discounts. lvi Finally, although most contracts in the
market contained an FOB delivery term, transactors could not agree
about its meaning, or even what the acronym stood for.lvii
9

More generally, the study also sought to explore whether the
transactors themselves thought that unwritten customs and usages of
trade exist. They were asked “[w]hen you use written contracts, or
purchase and sale orders, are there some unwritten rules or customs or
practices that you expect your trading partner to follow even though
they are not explicitly written down?” lviii Initially, 72% of the
respondents said unwritten practices existed, although four changed
their minds when asked to give an example. Among the 65.3% who
ultimately answered that these usages existed, all but two eventually
provided an example, lix but most did so only after a follow-up probe
that attempted to focus their attention on “quality or time or cost
considerations.” lx
Interestingly, most of the examples given by respondents would
not have qualified as unwritten usages under the Code. lxi Half of the
respondents either described practices that were set out in one the two
relevant sets of written trading rules, (the TGFA Trading Rules or the
Southwest Scale of discounts), lxii or referred to these sets of rules
themselves as customs. lxiii Twenty five percent made references to “old
boy” rules of thumb, lxiv and 19% noted aspects of agreements that were
sometimes left unwritten without noting whether they were given
meaning through usages or bilateral understandings. lxv
More broadly, the study suggests that merchants have a very
inaccurate understanding of the concepts of custom and usage, a finding
that raises questions about the reliability of merchant testimony
(whether expert or lay) about the content of trade usages. As discussed
further below, in most trade usage cases this is only type of usage
evidence introduced in court.
In sum, the studies of merchant industries discussed here suggest
that the types of trade usages the Code relies on so heavily may not in
fact exist in merchant communities. They do not seem to have existed in
the middle ages, they did not exist in important American industries at
the turn of the 20th Century, and the Texas study provides some limited
evidence that they do not presently exist even in a market as small and
homogeneous as the feed trade within 500 miles of Amarillo Texas, a
context where unlike most modern contexts, the preconditions for the
emergence of usages are largely present. Although these studies and
historical investigations are not perfect, it is notable that there are no
studies documenting that usages do exist. Contextualists repeatedly
dismiss the importance of investigating this issue, explaining that if
usages do not exist or are far less prevalent that commonly believed, the
rules of evidence can be relied on to ensure that nonexistent usages will
be excluded so they will play no role in contract adjudication. lxvi
10

This argument assumes, however, that courts and juries will do a
relatively good job distinguishing extant from nonexistent usages, and
that courts will not permit mere assertions that a usage exists to defeat
motions for summary judgment unless meaningful evidence of its
existence and scope is introduced. These are assumptions that need to be
evaluated not in the abstract, but rather in light of the way Code’s trade
usage provision operates in practice. Interestingly, while the Code
drafters were concerned that courts would set the evidentiary bar for
establishing usages too high, lxvii schooled as they were in the stricter
requirements for establishing a custom, precisely the opposite occurred.
As discussed further below, a recent study found that in practice the
evidentiary requirements for establishing a usage in court are, in
practice, quite lax.
B. Can Courts Find Usages
In defending the Code’s reliance on trade usage, contextualists
have long assumed that to prove a usage a party will have to introduce
“objective” evidence that the usage exists, in the form of either “expert
testimony and evidence about [the] statistical regularity of observance,”
or the submission of a “considerable mass of behavioral data,” lxviii
meaning “evidence of statistic norms—mere frequency of a given
behavior in the trade.”lxix This assumption is echoed in the leading Code
treatise, which opines that to prove a usage “a party must usually call on
an expert,” or introduce a written trade code. lxx Similar assertions are
made in most formbooks and practice manuals. lxxi
However, a study of all of the trade usage cases digested under
the Code’s trade usage provision from 1970-2000 demonstrates that in
practice the evidentiary requirements for establishing the existence of a
usage at trial are far less stringent. lxxii The study found that non-party
testimony (a category that includes both lay and expert witnesses) was
introduced in less than 30% of the cases and that parties sought to
introduce trade codes in only 11%. In cases that both went to trial and
found a custom to exist, non-party testimony was introduced by 16% of
plaintiffs and 28.2% of defendants. In over 50% of these cases, the
testimony of the parties and/or their employees was the only evidence of
usage introduced. Moreover, there was not a single case in which
statistical information about the regularity or frequency with which the
usage was followed was introduced. To the extent that regularity of
observance was mentioned at all in witness testimony, it was most
almost always simply asserted. There were only a few cases where
evidence of even a few actual transactions in which the usage was
followed was introduced.
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The study also found that similarly thin evidence was all that was
needed to demonstrate the existence of a usage with enough plausibility
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Non-movant’s were
successful in using usage-related arguments to defeat the motion 70% of
the time; and in 83% of the cases in which they did so, the only evidence
they introduced was a cursory affidavit from a party or a party’s
employees.
These and other findings of the study suggest that court
determinations relating to the existence, content and scope of usages are
likely to be both inaccurate and highly unpredictable, as they are
typically made on the basis of very limited information. lxxiii This study
also raises, though does not answer, the question of why, if usages are as
well-established and well-known as the Code assumes, more robust
evidence of their existence is not introduced in court, especially since
most of the sources consulted by practicing lawyers would suggest
(albeit incorrectly) that introducing such evidence is a necessary
precondition to a finding that a usage exists.
C. Do Transactors Clearly Prefer Contextualized Adjudication
The contextualized interpretive approach reflected in American
commercial law is often defended as a majoritarian default rule that
reflects the hypothetical bargain that transactors would have struck with
regard to interpretation had they been able to costlessly negotiate over
it. lxxiv There are, however, no studies documenting that such an
approach actually corresponds to transactors’ preferences. lxxv
It is impossible to measure the extent of parties’ preferences for
formalistic adjudication by looking at their contracts. This is due, in part,
to the fact that the Code’s contextualist interpretive approach is, in
practice, quasi-mandatory. lxxvi Nevertheless it is useful to explore
common contracting practices. A careful review of major supply
agreements reveals that certain types of contracts commonly include a
variety of provisions designed to ensure the primacy of the contract’s
written terms and to constrain the types of contextual considerations
courts can take into account. lxxvii The inclusion of these provisions is
particularly notable because, under current law, some of them are not
consistently enforced. The enforceability of others is either unclear or
remains untested despite their apparent conflict with the Code and its
Official Comments. lxxviii
Consider, for example, the Master Vendor Agreements used by large
Big Box retailers in their relationships with the vast majority of their
suppliers. These agreements typically contain provisions attempting to
negate the Code’s formation rules (including but not limited to the
12

battle-of-the-forms); lxxix clauses making clear that no courses of
dealing, lxxx courses of performance, actions, inactions or trade usages,
are to be construed as waivers or modifications of the agreement’s
written terms; lxxxi provisions negating the applicability of usages and
industry standards to interpretation of the contract; lxxxii clauses noting
that no estimates of future needs are to be relied on or considered
relevant in determining the scope of the agreement; lxxxiii time is of the
essence clauses requiring strict compliance with delivery dates; lxxxiv
provisions stating that perfect tender is required; lxxxv provisions defining
cure quite precisely or noting that no cure will be acceptable; lxxxvi
provisions making clear that any terms in purchase orders or
commitments made (either orally or in writing) during the life of the
parties contracting relationship are unenforceable unless memorialized
in a signed amendment to the Master Agreement; lxxxvii and, finally a
variety of merger, integration, and entire agreement clauses that are not
mere boilerplate but rather vary considerably in their specificity and
seek to exclude from consideration not only pre-contractal
considerations, but some post-contract ones as well. lxxxviii
The
widespread use of these clauses, which are also common in the Master
Supply Agreements between manufacturers and the suppliers of their
component parts, suggests a strong preference on the part of these
transactors for opting out of the context-specific Code provisions that
are at the core of the statute’s jurisprudential approach. Together these
clauses can be understood as a direct rejection of Code’s central
assumption that “the course of actual performance by the parties is the
best indicator of what they intended their writing to mean,” lxxxixand that
“the course of prior dealings between the parties and the usage of trade
were taken for granted when the document was phrased.” xc
More generally, a look at a wide variety of Material Contracts filed in
the Edgar system reveals that sophisticated transactors often use the
clauses described above, as well as an array of other types of clauses that
can fairly be understood as attempts to constrain the extent to which
courts will contextualize the interpretation of their written agreements in
the event of a dispute. The most extreme such provisions, while not in
widespread use, require arbitration and direct arbitrators to rule on the
basis of the written agreement’s “plain meaning.” xci A more tempered
approach, used in a variety of agreements for complex services, attempts
to assert the primacy of both the scope and meaning of the agreement’s
written terms by directing that they be given their “plain meaning,”
while providing a detailed preamble describing the purpose and goals of
the transactors business relationship that courts are directed to take into
consideration if, and only if, the provisions are found to be ambiguous
or the agreement fails to deal with a contingency. xcii These clauses reflect
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transactors’ preferences for the terms they write to be enforced as written
with a strong presumption that their plain meaning was intended, as
well as their recognition that contextualized interpretation may be
unavoidable in the case of an ambiguity or a contractual gap.
Nevertheless, despite transactors seeming acceptance of the necessity of
contextualist interpretation, the detail in these preambles together with
the directive that all gaps are to be filled and ambiguities resolved so as
to “give full effect to the provisions of th[e] preamble,” without
“expanding the scope of the Parties direct obligations,” xciii suggests that
that transactors want to constrain the court’s discretion when it engages
in even this highly limited type of contextualized purposeful
interpretation. Finally, it is interesting to note that attempts to opt out of
contextualism are not limited to the largest contracts. Provisions
attempting to out of or limit the role of trade usage, course of
performance and course of dealing, are also common in the standard
Terms and Conditions of small- and medium-sized product buyers and
sellers. xciv
The transactor preferences expressed in these Master Agreements
and Terms and Conditions of Trade are consistent with those reflected in
the jurisprudential approaches adopted by trade association-run private
legal systems. In these systems contract disputes are resolved by panels
of merchant arbitrators who do not apply the Code, but rather the Trade
Rules developed by and voted on by the very transactors whose
contracts they govern. xcv Arbitrators do not look to course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade to interpret contracts.
They only look to usages when faced with a contractual gap, a concept
they define far more narrowly than courts applying the Code. Good
faith and fair dealing provisions are also conspicuously absent from the
trade rules and play no role in the resolution of cases. In the main, these
private legal systems have adopted a highly textualist approach to
contractual adjudication.
Although there are a number of reasons that the costs of
textualism may be lower in private legal systems then in the public legal
system, the consistency of this preference across most merchant-run
systems suggests that at the time the Code was adopted, merchant
transactors preferred clear, definite, and specific rules together with a
formalistic adjudicative approach. Indeed, at the New York Law Reform
Commission’s hearings on the adoption of Article 2, representatives of
the Commerce and Industry Association specifically objected to some of
the Code’s most contextualist provisions. They objected to its lax
formation rules and its lenient statute of frauds on the grounds that
“you may find you have an unintended contract on your hands even
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though the ‘memorandum’ concerning a ‘sale omits all of the following:
price, time and place of payment, time and place of delivery, general
quality of goods, and warranties!” xcvi They also opposed the Code’s
non-waiveable obligations of good faith, commercial reasonableness and
reasonable care, explaining that looking to these considerations will “not
tend to greater precision in the law . . . the determination will result in
much litigation.” xcvii They also strenuously objected to the definition of
the merchant’s duty of good faith, explaining that it made “a
merchant . . . guilty of breach of contract if he does not observe
reasonable commercial standards,” yet “[t]he usages, customs, and
practices of business are far from being uniform, and the determination
of whether a merchant has conformed to reasonable commercial
standards would be difficult and would produce excessive
litigation.”xcviii Additional examples abound.
Although caution is warranted in abstracting from the trade
association context and there are no studies of the frequency with which
the contract provisions discussed here are included in commercial
agreements, some systematic evidence about whether sophisticated
transactors prefer highly contextualist or more formalist adjudicative
approaches can be found in studies of choice-of-law provisions in large
commercial contracts. xcix A recent study looked at whether transactors
entering into a variety of types of large commercial agreements (not
exclusively sale of goods transactions) preferred to be governed by
relatively contextual California law or relatively formalist New York law
that is more protective of the terms of written agreements. It found a
marked preference for New York law concluding that “the testimony of
the marketplace, the verdict of thousands of sophisticated parties whose
incentives are to maximize the value of contract terms—is that New
York’s formalistic rules win out over California’s contextualist approach.
As predicted by theory, sophisticated parties prefer formalistic rules of
contract law.” c The generality of this conclusion is buttressed by the
findings of two studies. One looked at the choice of law provisions in
European business transactions subject to ICC arbitration; it found a
strong transactor preference for British Law, which is considered the
most formalist of the EU countries. ci The other surveyed contract
managers about the types of contract provisions they thought would be
most “proactive in supporting successful relations;” it found that
“entirety of agreement clauses,” were the second most common
response. cii
In sum, the types of contract provisions discussed here, together with
the adjudicative approaches of merchant tribunals and the choice of law
provisions in corporations’ material contracts, suggest that both
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merchant transactors engaged in the sale of cash commodities and
sophisticated transactors entering into complex supply chain
transactions attempt to reject the Code’s contextualist adjudicative
approach. In its place, transactors are attempt to contract for a
interpretive approach that both gives primacy to the terms of their
written agreement and protects those terms from erosion, ciii modification,
or waiver through the actions, inactions, and communications (both
written an oral) of either transactors’ employees that occurred before
and after their written agreement was signed.
It is impossible to determine from the empirical evidence currently
available whether contextualism or formalism is a majoritarian
preference. The evidence discussed here, however, is nonetheless strong
enough to suggest that transactors do not have a uniform preference for
contextual adjudication. Together with the theoretical arguments
presented below, this evidence suggests that the Code’s adjudicative
approach, which is, in practice, a quasi-mandatory rule rather than a
pure default rule, should be turned into a pure default that transactors
can opt out of either on a contract-by-contract basis, or as some
commentators have suggested, a term-by-term basis. civ
II. CONTEXTUALISM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY
Over the past few decades the structure of important sectors of
American businesses have undergone a shift from large vertically
integrated concerns to large multi-agent firms who keep only their “core
competencies” in house. These firms outsource the production of
important components of their products, many of which are specially
manufactured and thus involve specific investment. A number of these
firms also adopt some variant of just-in-time inventory practices. This
section explores the uneasy fit between these types of supply
relationships and the jurisprudence of the Code. It begins by suggesting
that the Code’s contextualized adjudicative approach is ill-suited to
these transactions for many of the same reasons that it is ill-suited to the
simple merchant transactions in industries that have created private
legal systems—it stifles work-a-day flexibility, prevents firms from
contracting using their preferred mix of legal and extralegal terms, and
facilitates strategic behavior. It then identifies additional respects in
which the Code is particularly ill-suited to transactions among multiagent firms paying special attention to its impact on intra-firm agency
costs, intra-firm information costs, operational costs, and the costs of
entering into contracts for innovation.
A. Flexibility
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The Code’s provisions on course of dealing and course of
performance were designed to encourage work-a-day contractual
flexibility; yet they are likely to have precisely the opposite effect. In the
course of business operations, there are adjustments that transactors find
it worthwhile to make at a particular point in time that they would, for
any of a number of reasons, be unwilling to promise to make in a legally
enforceable agreement. Sometimes these adjustments implicitly
condition on information that is observable but not verifiable (such as
whether or not one’s contracting partner is trustworthy). Other times
they simply reflect on the spot compromises that seem reasonable (or
necessary) to the employee making them at the time they are made, but
that might not be desirable on a go forward basis under all
circumstances. Because the Code creates a risk that these actions, if
taken more than twice, will be considered binding courses of
performance or dealing (or, at a minimum, be looked to understand
what the parties intended their written agreement to mean), transactors
are less likely than they would be in a more formalist system to behave
flexibly and make value creating on the spot adjustments; they know
that if they do so and a dispute arises, they may no longer have a right to
insist on compliance with their contract’s written terms.
Under the Code, firms can take action to reduce this risk by sending
letters stating that any concessions are on a one-time basis only.
However, to ensure that letters were sent where needed, firms would
have to educate employees at many levels of their organization about
the terms of the firm’s written agreements (so they would at least be
aware when they do something non-conforming). This process would be
quite expensive. The firm would also have to put monitoring systems in
place to ensure that actions at variance with the contract’s written terms
were detected and the proper letters sent. In addition, in certain types of
contractual relationships (such as highly personal long standing
relationships between smaller firms), the sending of these letters might
result in significant relational costs. cv Recognizing the costs and
difficulty of making these decisions on an occurrence-by-occurrence
basis helps explain the ubiquity of anti-waiver provisions in these
agreements.
In recent years, however, firms have begun to use automated
systems to detect certain types of deviations from the contracts written
terms and generate these letters automatically. For example, many big
box retailers have programmed their contract administration software to
generate these notices whenever a delivery ticket is scanned into the
system that indicates a delivery is late or the quantity on the ticket does
not match the quantity in the relevant purchase order. The
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depersonalized nature of these letters and the widespread adoption of
this software has made the sending of these notices so routine that they
no longer seem to result in relational costs.
B. Preferred Mix of Legal and Extralegal Terms
In some contracting contexts (often, though not exclusively, when
reputation information is widely available) parties may find it desirable
to supplement the terms of their written legally enforceable contracts
with extralegal commitments backed only by reputation bonds and
other types of nonlegal sanctions. These commitments can add
significant value to transactions. For example, in certain types of feed
transactions where reputation is important, contracts often specify that a
federal weight must be obtained at the shipment’s destination. However,
actually getting a federal weight is both time-consuming and expensive.
As a consequence, transactors who trust one another often agree to
waive this requirement and use one another’s in house weights so long
as each believes the other is acting in good faith. If one or the other
becomes suspicious, they can simply demand a return to the contract’s
written terms, confident that in the event of a dispute the industry’s
private legal system will not find their course of conduct to have altered
the terms of their written agreement. If, however, these transactions
were covered by Code, the parties would be much less likely to enter
into these value creating extralegal agreements, since the Code would
likely wind up enforcing them in the event of a dispute.
An example of a value creating extralegal commitment in the
context of the modern supply chain can be found in buyers’ written
commitments to provide their suppliers with regularly updated
forecasts of their purchasing needs, while at the same making it
abundantly clear in their contracts, service level agreements, and vendor
guides that these forecasts are not to be relied on, are not guaranteed to
be accurate, and do not commit the buyer firm to purchase a specified or
even any amount of goods. cvi This type of extralegal commitment
creates value by enabling the seller to engage in better planning and
giving the buyer greater confidence that the seller will produce enough
to meet its orders in a timely fashion; yet it is precisely the type of
commitment a buyer would be much less likely to make, were it legally
enforceable. Additional examples of value creating but legally
unenforceable commitments in business relationships are common. cvii
The significance of preventing transactors from structuring their
contracting relationship using their preferred mix of legally enforceable
and legally unenforceable terms depends on the contracting context. In
the context of discrete one-time contracts for the purchase of standard
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goods in a market the buyer rarely enters, the loss may be small or nonexistent. In contrast, in markets where reputation information is widely
available and parties deal with one another or within a segment of a
market on a repeat basis over a long period of time, the losses
occasioned by Code’s adjudicative approach may be significant.
C. Strategic Behavior Costs
Neoformalist scholars cviii writing in the law and economics tradition
have suggested that the Code’s contextualized approach to
interpretation together with its trade usage provision encourage
strategic behavior by enabling a party who is seemingly disadvantaged
by the ordinary meaning of a contract’s explicit terms to strategically
claim that the contract was written in an industry-specific (usage-based)
“private language” that favors his position.cix They argue that replacing
the Code’s quasi-mandatory contextualist interpretive approach with a
textualist default (which they maintain is the clear majoritarian
preference), while permitting transactors to explicitly opt into
contextualism, will largely eliminate this type behavior. When
textualism is the default, transactors who want a court to look to a
private language will have to specify this choice ex-ante; if they don’t
they will be barred from raising this type of argument ex-post. The rule
will therefore eliminate purely strategic ex-post claims that the contract
was written in a private language. At the same time, it will enable
transactors who genuinely want a court to interpret their contract on the
assumption that it was written in a private language to easily select this
option simply by including a provision saying something like: “this
contract is to be governed by the usages in the widget industry,” a
provision that under the proposed approach would be summarily
enforced.
Although this proposed switch to a textualist default would largely
eliminate private language-related strategic behavior when transactors
opt for textualism, it will not (as some theorists suggest) cx do so as
effectively when parties opt for contextualism, even if they include a
clause specifying the private language in which their contract is written.
As the case studies of codification revealed, even within highly local
areas, and trades narrowly defined, there is much disagreement about
the meaning of even basic terms of trade. Consequently, unless the
private language selected is codified in written set of rules (such as the
Incoterms) ex-post a party will almost always be able to plausibly assert
the existence of a different private meaning that supports his
interpretation, thus reintroducing the strategic behavior problem. cxi
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Nevertheless, the adoption of a textualist default is superior to the
current quasi-mandatory contextualist interpretive regime for several
reasons. First, it is far less costly for transactors who want contextualized
adjudication to include a provision opting for it than it is for transactors
who want to opt out of the Code’s approach to do so (even to the
arguably limited extent that this is possible). cxii Second, requiring
transactors to opt in to a private language alerts them to what they are
doing and creates an incentive for them to specify the particular private
language they are choosing. Although, as noted above, they will still be
able to engage in strategic behavior as to private meanings, making this
designation may at least partially cabin the range of private meanings
they can plausibly assert. This suggests that strategic behavior costs may
be lower and, in any event, are unlikely to be higher, than they are
under the present rule. Third, reversing the default will eliminate issues
surrounding the question of whether a transactor knew or had a reason
to know the content of these private languages, since the issue will be
resolved by contract. Finally, if neoformalist theorists are correct that
businesses prefer a textualist default (which can be defined in many
ways other than the caricature of plain meaning or “hard literalism”
asserted by most contextualists as the relevant alternative), cxiii the
interpretive default approach of commercial law will again reflect
majoritarian preferences.
The benefits of adopting a more textualist default rule are even
greater once the effects of the new rule on motions for summary
judgment are taken into account. As the study of usage in the courts
discussed above revealed, under the Code’s approach, even if a private
language does not exist, a party can claim it does, introduce nothing
more than a cursory affidavit form one of his employees asserting its
existence, and thereby (with a significantly high probability) defeat a
motion for summary judgment, a move that greatly reduces the
settlement value of a claim cxiv as well as the value of any judgment the
moving party eventually receives. Under the textualist default, in
contrast, transactors opting for textualism will have more ready access to
summary judgment, and for those who prefer contextualism summary
judgment will be no less available then it is under the current
interpretive regime.
A final benefit of the proposed change to a textualist interpretive
default and the one that is most important to the law’s ability to adapt to
support complex private commercial contracting, is that when
transactors opt for textualism, the return they receive from careful
contractual drafting will increase because the terms they write will be
enforced as written and will not eroded or undermined by usage based
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interpretation. Although the Code’s hierarchy of authority states that
express terms trump conflicting usages, in practice courts routinely
permit usages to override or erode written provisions. Usages are
commonly found to be “consistent” with seemingly contrary express
provision unless the usage is found to “totally negate” the express
provision,cxv a finding that is very rarely made. As one court observed,
“[i]n cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts have
regarded the established practices and usages within a particular trade
or industry as a more reliable indicator of the true intentions of the
parties than the sometimes imperfect and often incomplete language of
the written contract. The courts have allowed such extrinsic evidence to
modify the apparent agreement, as seen in the written terms, so long as
it does not totally negate it.” cxvi And, as another explained “the trend has
been for judges, looking beyond written contract terms to reach the ‘true
understanding’ of the parties, to extend themselves to reconcile trade
usage and course of dealing with seemingly contradictory express terms.
They have permitted course of dealing and usage of trade to add terms,
cut down or subtract terms, or lend special meaning to contract
language.” cxvii By removing the interpretive discount on written terms,
the neoformalist proposal will increase the return to contract drafting,
which will likely lead to clearer contracts, fewer disputes occasioned by
misunderstandings, and a decrease in the social costs of disputing.
Contextualists oppose a shift to a more textualist default on the
grounds that it will greatly increase the specification costs of entering to
a contract because transactors will choose to spell out more aspects of
their agreement. However, the widespread use of master agreements,
standard purchase orders, and detailed vendor guides (which are
routinely incorporated into contracts), together with the availability of
model contracts from both the internet and law firms specializing in
particular sorts of outsourcing contracts (such as technology
outsourcing), suggests that any increase is likely to be small on a per
contract basis. The shift in default rule will also decrease the
specification costs occasioned by transactors’ desire to fortify their
contracts against contextualist interpretation, a saving that may not be
insignificant. Finally, as discussed further below, once it is recognized
that firms need to memorialize both the explicit and implicit terms of
their agreements in writing so that they can be disseminated throughout
the firm’s organizational hierarchy, it becomes clear that any savings
from omitting terms in the contract between the parties is likely to be
slight.
Wholly apart from its effects on drafting costs, a switch to a more
formalist default rule may produce a variety of other cost savings and
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transactional benefits for firms, many of which stem from enabling them
to use both legal and extra legal commitments and sanctions to structure
their transactional relationship. In addition, as discussed further below,
the availability of a textualist default will save firms the cost of adopting
a variety of agency cost reduction mechanisms that the Code’s
contextualism makes it necessary for them to implement and will enable
them to adapt more effective and less expensive contract governance
structures. cxviii
More generally, an interpretive approach that encourages transactors
to invest in improving their written contracts will do more to support
trade in the face of changing conditions and complex interdependent
agreements than any system based on the incorporation of gradually
evolving usages. As the case studies discussed above revealed,
convergent understandings of trade usages are slow to evolve and
consensus on the meaning of terms and industry practices is difficult to
achieve even through negotiation among industry participants. This
process is especially slow and difficult in contexts where the relevant
usages apply to transactions across stages in a chain of production and
distribution. Given these difficulties, the complexity of modern
outsourcing transactions, and the fact that these transactions typically
take place between large multi-agent firms (an aspect of these
transactions discussed further below) the evolution of usages related to
outsourcing transactions is likely be highly problematic, making the
Code a poor vehicle for responding to the contract governance
challenges these transactions create.
D. Intra-Firm Agency Costs
In thinking about the ability of the Code to support contractual
relationships between multi-agent firms, it is important to focus not only
on how the Code affects the costs of firm A dealing with firm B, but also
the way these considerations affect the intra-firm agency and
transactions costs within firm A and within firm B. These intra-firm costs
are not part of the standard analysis of the costs and benefits of different
types of contract rules and interpretive approaches—which typically
compare the effect of a particular approach on specification costs and
litigation costs respectively-- and have received only sporadic mention
in the legal literature. cxix However, they need to be systematically taken
into account in any future efforts at legal reform. As the examples below
illustrate, the functional consequences of contextualist adjudication for
the management and operation of multi-agent firms may be significant.
To get a feel for the way the Code creates and/or exacerbates internal
firm agency costs, consider its provision on contract formation which
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states that “a contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contact.” cxx This provision creates a
risk that an employee may, through her words, actions, and/or written
communications, knowingly or unknowingly bind the firm to
contractual obligations. Large firms routinely hold seminars to educate
employees about this aspect of the Code in an effort to prevent them
from inadvertently binding the firm. In addition, given the especially
large financial exposure the Code’s formation rules create, firms also
attempt to control this risk through explicit contractual provisions.
One common method is for the buyer-firm to post a Master
Agreement (or a set of Standard Terms and Conditions) on its supplier
portal web site along with a prominent statement that these are the only
terms on which it will do business. cxxi These agreements typically set
forth an exhaustive list of the ways the buyer-firm is and is not willing to
enter into binding agreements. For example, Dollar General’s Master
Agreement states that “in no event will an e-mail or other
communication, regardless of its content, that is not a signed paper
purchase Order or electronic Order issued via Buyer’s EDI system,
constitute an Order for the purposes of this Agreement . . . [Neither]
Buyer and/or its affiliates have any obligation or liability with respect to
such an email or other communication.” cxxii In addition to limiting its
exposure when its employees fail to stay in line with the company’s
contracting policies, this provision shifts the burden of monitoring
compliance with the company’s policy to its vendors—because vendors
will not be paid for unauthorized orders, they have an incentive to
closely monitor the province of the orders they do receive.
Firms also use these master agreements/standard terms to attempt to
opt out of the Code’s battle-of-the-forms provision, a provision that also
gives rise to agency problems within both buyer and seller firms. cxxiii
These agreements typically categorically reject any additional or
different terms that might be introduced by a trading partner’s standard
forms, the firm’s own service level agreements and purchase orders, or
any oral or side understandings. They state very clearly that the firm
will not do business on any terms other than their standard posted terms.
Although this approach is likely to be effective when the transactors
have both signed a master agreement or only one of them has posted a
master agreement or set of terms and conditions on the web, it is not
uncommon for both buyers and sellers to both post similar statements, a
practice that simply recreates the potential for a battle-of-the-forms
when the website of suppliers and buyers conflict.
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The Code’s course of dealing and course of performance provisions
create analytically similar agency problems in the performance phase of
an agreement. Together they give a firm’s employees the power to
modify, waive, and alter the meaning of the firm’s written contracts;
they can do this through their words, their written exchanges with their
counterparty, their actions, and their inactions. Large multi-agent firms
are highly unlikely to want their employee’s to have this power. These
firms go to extraordinary lengths to adopt explicit written internal
policies that carefully articulate the contours of the explicit contractual
authority (if any) delegated to mangers/employees at different levels of
the corporate hierarchy. cxxiv Given these (costly) efforts to control the
explicit contracting authority of their employees, it seems highly
unlikely that these firms would want their employees to be empowered
to do indirectly what they are explicitly prohibited from doing directly.
Indeed, the difficulty firms face in trying to eliminate the risk of
employees affecting the legal meaning of their written contracts, may be
one reason for the ubiquity of anti-waiver, anti-modification, and
merger/integration clauses in these agreements. However, the
interpretive protection offered by these clauses (even in jurisdictions
where they are enforceable) is far from complete. Well-drawn clauses
may prevent employee’s actions from modifying or waiving contractual
provisions, but the actions of a firm’s agents will remain relevant to
interpreting the meaning of the firm’s contract if a court find a contract
provision to be ambiguous. In addition, while “entire agreement”
clauses sometimes try to make these considerations irrelevant to contract
interpretation generally, the enforceability of this aspect of these
provisions does not appear to have been tested.
Other Code provisions may introduce agency problems that are even
more difficult to eliminate or reduce through intra-firm policies or
contractual provisions. For example, the Code’s provision on demands
for adequate assurance of performance can be triggered by the off-hand
remarks of an employee indicating financial problems at the firm or the
mention of problems the company is having in a contract with an
entirely other firm. Similarly, the time for cure may extended beyond the
delivery date if the seller makes a nonconforming tender but had a
reasonable belief (perhaps based on comments from the buyer’s
personnel) that it would be acceptable to the buyer with or without a
price adjustment. The applicability of these code provisions can be
triggered by a wide variety of statements by employees at many levels
of a firm’s organizational structure and is difficult to control through
intra-firm monitoring and/or company policies. As a consequence, to
guard against the significant legal implications of statements made by its
employees, firms might find it necessary to limit employee access to
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information that it might otherwise be desirable for employees to have.
Alternatively, within limits, transactors might be able to contract for a
limited and exclusive list of events that may trigger a demand for
adequate assurances and/or can try to contract out of the Code’s cure
provisions. cxxv
More generally, recognizing the existence of these intra-firm agency
costs suggests that in assessing the costs of contextualism, it is important
to take into account the costs, including the inflexibility costs, oversight
costs, and information flow costs, of the policies, contract provisions,
and other mechanisms firms must adopt if they want, as most business
concerns do, to control the existence, performance and meaning of their
contracts.
E. Information Costs
Within large multi-agent firms, the people entering into contracts are
not, for the most part those who carry them out. In order for a deal to be
administered within a large organization, the purchasing managers and
their subordinates in the buyer’s organization, as well as the selling
agents and production managers in the seller’s organization, all have to
understand the quality, quantity, and delivery specifications (including
timing, packaging and labeling) of the contract. The “key to a successful
outcome,” is said to be “carrying out a detailed contract handover
session from the bid/negotiation team to the post-award management
team.” cxxvi
According to the International Association for Contract and
Commercial Management, “for a complex outsourcing contract . . . this
might be a half a day of the pre-award and post award teams sitting
together in a meeting room, each with a copy of the contract, going
through page by page. cxxvii In addition, the bid/negotiation team is
advised to provide a great deal of background on the deal. This is often
viewed as “more important than handing over documents,” because
“the interpretation and history of how we ended up where we did in
negotiations is key to understanding the risks and opportunities arising
and which need to be managed during contract management.” cxxviii They
will also, in the absence of a contract provision to the contrary, have to
recount any prior courses of dealing between the parties, something that
will be costly and, in the event of a change in personnel, also quite
difficult to do with accuracy.
Incident to these handover sessions, and in recognition of the fact
that the oral communication of this information about contract terms is
subject to considerable error, most firms require the bid/negotiation
team to fill out a template form summarizing the key terms of the deal
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from various financial and operational perspectives. cxxix As a
consequence, even if the principals to the contracting relationship had
implicit understandings based on usages of trade or prior courses of
dealing, or were simply willing to let the Code’s context dependant
default rules fill the gaps in their agreement, they would still need to
memorialize many of these understandings in writing as part of the
contract hand-off process, thereby greatly reducing any specification
cost saving benefits created by the Code’s gap-fillers and its
contextualized interpretive approach.
Moreover, because firms are aware that this type of deal hand-off
process will be followed, they will have an increased incentive to
include these understandings in their writings. The marginal cost of
including them in the contract over and above the cost of memorializing
them for its own employees will be small, at least with respect to many
types of provisions, such as those related to operational specifications
and acceptable deviations from quality/quantity provisions. In addition,
as contract coding software (that enables users to pull up all operational
specifications, all financial specification, or all production metrics with
one mouse click) comes into wider use, the contract provisions dealing
with these aspects of the deal can be captured by the software and
provided directly to operations, thus creating a cheaper more seamless
transfer of information that is both less expensive and less prone to error,
then the current contract hand-off process.
Indeed, even with all of the efforts firms make to disseminate
contract information through these detailed handover sessions, firms
report that among those charged with implementing contracts, there
remains a well-documented “lack of consensus over what constitutes the
contract,” and the extent to which it includes emails, oral
communications, SOW [scope of work], SLAs [service level agreement]
as well as invoices, operational reports, and other communications
within and between firms.” cxxx This confusion, which contract managers
work hard to eliminate, is nonetheless entirely understandable given the
Codes broad definition of agreement and its lax parol evidence rule.
More generally, the need for the terms of a contract to be
disseminated through various levels of a firm’s hierarchy suggests that
contrary to the implicit assumption of contextualists, the principals to a
transaction and the court are not the only audiences for the contract’s
language. Indeed, taking into account the need to inform agents of the
contract’s content undermines contextualists main defense of the
methods cost saving benefits—namely, that transactors will save on
specification costs by relying on default rules and usages rather than
spelling out their understandings in explicit contract provisions, while
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any increased litigation costs contextualism may create will only be
incurred if a dispute goes to court, something that occurs with a low
probability. cxxxi Once the cost of the bid/negotiation team summarizing
and describing to the operations team what a contract that relies on
usages and default rules actually requires is taken into account, most if
not all of the specification cost savings from the availability of
contextualist defaults is likely to disappear. Moreover, given the
uncertainty introduced when translating the tacit elements of the
transaction into the firm’s template term sheet, and the greater
likelihood that a dispute will arise due to a misunderstanding of what
the contract requires, it is also important recognize that when transactors
rely on the availability of the Code’s defaults and trade usages, the
likelihood of a dispute requiring court adjudication also increases.
F. Operational Costs
Many large organizations adopt contracting policies that are not
tailored to individual agreements, but rather are optimized over a larger
set of the firms contracting relationships. Large big box retailers for
example, typically memorialize their policies in vendor guideswhich
apply to the vast majority of the firm’s routine transactions. These
guides cover the extent of permitted quality deviations, what constitutes
on time delivery, the types of paper work and SKU codes that must be
used, and dozens of different dimensions of logistics (which have a
significant impact on the profitability of a deal). The policies set forth in
these guides are optimized over a large number of the company’s
contracts; they are not tailored to the purchase of any particular input
and do not take into account usages of trade that might exist in
particular industries. As a consequence, if a dispute were to arise and go
to court, it would be open to the seller to argue that the buyer is a
merchant in the type of goods at issue and should be bound to the
usages common in the trade; that the seller’s specifications are
unreasonable applied as to the transaction at issue; or that the usage is
relevant to interpreting the contracts written provisions, even if they are
not ambiguous. cxxxii These concerns are quite real to firms; as the Target
Master Vendor Agreement states: “Regardless of industry standards, no
variances with respect to quality, quantity, size, capacity, volume,
content or other standard measure of Goods are allowed.” cxxxiii
More generally, there a fundamental tension between the Code
which looks at the usages related to the particular contract at issue, and
the policies of large firms, which are developed to be optimal over a
large number of contracts that may involve a variety of markets with
vastly different practices. Moreover, given the number of individuals
within the corporate hierarchy who would have to have actual
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knowledge of usages in order to operationalize them, the cost to bigger
entities of usages being read into their agreements is potentially large.
G. Innovation Costs
Contract theorists, writing about the economics of supply chain
relationships,
have
suggested
that
many
such
contracts
cxxxiv
involve ”contracting for innovation,”
which they describe as a
situation where the transactors’ relationship is not mediated “by fully
specified explicit contracts . . . nor by entirely implicit relational
contracts supported only by the norms of reciprocity and the expectation
of future dealings.” cxxxv Rather, in these contracting contexts, “the
explicit and implicit obligations interact within a formal governance
structure that regulates the exchange of highly revealing information but
does not necessarily impose legally enforceable obligations to buy or sell
anything,” and thereby supports “iterative collaboration between firms
[in creating or improving products and systems] by interweaving
explicit and implicit terms that respond to the uncertainty inherent in
the innovation process.” cxxxvi The success or failure of these ventures is
said to depend critically on the parties’ ability to achieve deliberate and
delicate “braiding” cxxxvii of legal and extralegal obligations and sanctions.
Given the structure and operation of these collaborative ventures, the
Code’s adjudicative approach (which as discussed above transforms
many legally unenforceable aspects of the transactors’ agreement into
legally enforceable contract provisions and many of their work-a-day
actions into legally enforceable obligations) is likely to both increase the
cost and impair the operation of these types of contracting relationships.
Among other things, it will decrease the work-a-day flexibility and free
flow of information that is essential to the success of such ventures and
greatly increase the likelihood that courts will make interpretive errors
when disputes arise. As innovation theorists have noted, the Code’s
course of dealing and course of performance provisions undermine
collaborative activities, because “there is a constant risk that a
collaborators’ experimentation will be interpreted as a modification of
the contract,” cxxxviii and errors are likely since “courts [will] have
insufficient information from which to glean patterns in the disputants’
behavior,” given the “[t]he constant experimentation that generative
contracts institutionalize.” cxxxix The Code’s usage of trade provision is
viewed as similarly disruptive to contracting relationships (especially if,
as the evidence presented above suggests, the information base available
to the court to distinguish extant from non-existent usages is thin)
because the invocation of concepts like “trade usage, which use wider
industry norms to interpret the meaning of a contract, will likely lead
the court astray since collaborators are often actively trying to forsake
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industry conventions as they innovate.” cxl In addition, and perhaps
most importantly, the Code’s overall contextualized approach will
increase the cost of entering into “contracts for innovation,” as parties
will need to use both complex agreements (with many clauses whose
legal enforceability is doubtful) that are costly to draft and adapt to the
particular context, as well as detailed governance structures to create
zones of collaborative interaction that can operate free from legal
intervention.
In sum, the types of conceptual, institutional and operational
considerations discussed here, along with a recognition of the role
nonlegal sanctions and extralegal agreements and adjustments can play
in even the most complex and institutionalized agreements, suggests
that the contextualized jurisprudence of the Code is unlikely to qualify
as a majoritarian default rule in a 21st century, highly outsourced
economy. The Code’s adjudicative approach has the effect of both
undermining the value of written contracts and impeding the creation
and implementation of institutional structures that are designed to
create zones of contracting behavior that operate free from judicial
oversight or legal consequences yet nevertheless add tremendous value
to some of the simplest and most complex contracting relationships alike.
Industries and firms have devised a sophisticated array of methods
for minimizing or avoiding the effect of the Code’s default rules and
adjudicative approach and increasing the value of the terms of their
written contracts. These range from the private legal systems and
trading rules created by trade associations in merchant industries, to a
variety of mechanisms used in more complex outsourcing transactions
that enable transactors to conduct important parts of their contracting
relationships largely (though not entirely) outside of the shadow of the
legal system. These mechanisms include: supplier qualification
processes and vendor scorecard programs that are used to create
nonlegal sanctions and harness the forces of the folk theorem of iterative
games to support cooperative contracting relationships; the creation of
interior remedies in SLAs and easy to exercise termination rights in
Master Agreements that provide parties with “self-help” options that
reduce the need to rely on legal remedies for breach of contract; and a
variety of mechanisms (such as audit rights cxli and the right to demand a
root cause analysis cxlii) designed to enable buyers to determine (without
filing a suit for breach of contracting and engaging in civil discovery)
whether problems that arise over the life of the contract reflect failed
attempts at cooperation or deliberate acts of defection. Although these
contracting practices and structures might survive even if the law were
moved in the direction of giving greater primacy to written contracts
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and respecting transactors’ desire for freedom from contract (for the law
is limited in its ability to create value for contracting parties), such a
change is nevertheless important to the future success of American
business. It would not only reduce the agency costs, operational costs,
and information costs within firms, but would also eliminate some of the
inflexibility costs created by firms attempts to minimize the negative
effect of the Code on their operations. More generally, while the type of
change contemplated might not entirely eliminate some of the
institutional structures, contractual arrangements, and operational
processes that were created to better support trade in the shadow of the
Code, it would very likely improve their functioning and enable firms
and industries to adopt them at a far lower cost than they can in the
shadow of the Code.
CONCLUSION
This essay has explored the questionable empirical basis of the
Code’s adjudicative architecture. It has also suggested that even if the
Code worked in practice the way Llewellyn and modern day
incorporationists thought it would work in theory, its highly
contextualized adjudicative approach, its reliance on unwritten usages,
and its insistence that parties actions under a contract are the best
indication of what they intend their writing to mean, would make the
Code ill-suited to the needs of important sectors of the modern, highly
outsourced, economy, even if it were extensively amended.
These reasons for suggesting that the Code’s “machinery” for
adapting to change is broken, and that an entirely new approach to the
content and theory of sales law is required, are curiously parallel to
Llewellyn’s reasons for advocating the adoption of an entirely new
commercial code rather than proposing extensive amendments to the
Uniform Sales Act. As Llewellyn explained, the Sales Act was based on
“concepts that took shape on the basis of a face-to-face dealing with
present goods,” whereas the American economy in the 1920’s and 1930’s
was increasingly dominated by the emergence of a “nationwide indirect
marketing structure” in which most contracts were executory and a
large portion of trade was mediated by brokers and factors of various
sorts. Llewellyn concluded that these structural changes were so
significant that the “present trends and present needs” of commerce
could not be met through amendments to the Sales Act, but rather
required a fundamental reconceptualization of the role of law in
commercial life and the adoption of a statute that was responsive to and
reflective of those changes.
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The ground up reimagining of sales law suggested here would
require reformers to recognize that the contracts play many roles in
transactions (especially in multi-agent firms) beyond merely regulating
the terms of exchange between the parties and providing rules in the
event of a dispute. They play a significant role in influencing the
information flow throughout the firm’s organizational hierarchy and
provide a framework that enables firms to use the law to create contract
governance structures that use interior remedies and nonlegal sanctions
much as trade association-run private legal systems do, thereby creating
flexible, cooperative contractual relationships that are capable of
meeting the needs for precision in quality and timing, as well as the
need to respond to changes and make corrections mid course, that are
the hallmarks of successful manufacturing outsourcing transactions.
Most fundamentally, however, reformers would have to accept that
the institutional structures created by market transactors are far more
likely to respond efficiently to changes in business needs than are
unwritten customs and judicial conceptions of commerce. This is
especially true if the institutions are free to adopt their own rules and
courts give primacy to the terms of written agreements, turning to other
considerations only in the case of a true contractual gap, narrowly
defined. Just as the medieval law merchant of bills and notes--the only
law merchant that ever really existed--evolved from the use and
adaption of standard-form contracts over time, aided by the rise of
institutions like notaries and registrars, cxliii so too American commercial
law can best and most quickly adapt to the changes it must confront
now and in the future, by recognizing the central importance of
enforcing the explicit written terms of private agreements and
encouraging the emergence and endurance of private institutions that
support trade.
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provisions that are so ubiquitous in the Code. See Alan Schwartz and
Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 595 (1995).
lxxvi See Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 72 at __; Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 Yale L. J. 541, 585 fn. 84 (2003)[hereinafter Limits] (concluding that
the Code’s interpretive rules are “quasi-mandatory”).
lxxvii See also Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation
Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010) (suggesting that the terms of alliance
agreements reflect transactors preferences for formalistic adjudication).
lxxviii The enforceability of some of these provisions has not been tested,
yet a close reading of the Code and its Official Comments suggests that
they might not be enforced by a court that sought to follow both the letter
and/or the sprit of the Code.
lxxix Most of the contracts state that contracts cannot be created verbally,
Nordstrom, Cl 2 (“Verbal orders will not be valid unless confirmed with
a written or electronic purchase order”), while others go further
emphasizing that email orders are also considered invalid and noting
that only orders submitted on a signed copy of the buyer’s standard
purchase order or through the company’s EDI system will be binding.
Most of these agreements also all contain language attempting to contract
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out of the battle of the forms, see e.g, Burlington Coat Factory, Express
Terms and Conditions, Cl. 2 (“THE TERMS STATED IN THIS ORDER
ARE THE ONLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PURCHASER AND
VENDOR RELATING TO THE GOODS AND SHALL NOT BE VARIED
BY ANY ADDITIONAL OR INCONSISTENT TERMS CONTAINED IN
ANY LATER INVOICE, CONFIRMATION OR OTHER MATERIAL OF
VENDOR”); Radio Shack, Terms and Conditions of Purchase, Cl. 1 (“Any
document of Seller [that] conflicts with, contradicts or adds to any
provision, terms or conditions of this Agreement . . . is hereby rejected
(unless specifically agreed to in a separate document executed by the
Buyer) and the provisions, terms and conditions of this Agreement and
the PO by such acceptance shall constitute the whole contract between
the parties. Any statement purporting to make Seller’s acceptance
conditional on Buyer’s assent to additional or different terms are hereby
rejected and shall be of no effect. Buyer shall have the right to make
reasonable changes to any PO from time-to-time . . . To the extent that
Buyer and Seller are parties to Buyer’s form of Vendor Agreement and
any of the terms and conditions of such Vendor Agreement conflicts with
the terms of this Agreement the Vendor Agreement shall govern.”)
lxxx See e.g. Target Supply Agreement, Conditions of Contract,
Partnersonline.com, Cl. 21 and 20b (the “Purchaser’s right to require strict
observance of the terms of the Contract shall not be waived by course of
dealing” and “The Contract may not be modified by course of dealing,
course of performance, or any oral communication between Purchaser
and Vendor. The Contract may only be modified by (i) a separate written
agreement signed by Vendor and an authorized agent or officer of
Purchaser, or (ii) Purchaser providing Vendor, with respect to future
Purchase Orders, with advance written or electronic notice “). See also
Kohl’s providing that course of dealing may not create a waiver Kohl’s at
20 (“Kohl’s’ rights herein are reserved and may be exercised at any time
as long as any breach of any of the terms or conditions hereof shall
continue, and shall not be deemed waived by delay or by waiver of such
condition or any other condition hereof in previous transactions between
the parties.”)
lxxxi Radio Shack Corp. Purchase Order Terms and Conditions, Cl. 19, 21
(“No course of dealing or course of performance between Buyer and
Seller nor any delay or omission of Buyer to exercise any right or remedy
granted under this Agreement shall operate as a waiver of any rights of
Buyer,” nor shall any “trade custom or practice, course of dealing or
course of performance between Buyer and Seller shall operate as a
modification or amendment of this Agreement”)
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Clauses opting out of usage for the purpose of interpretation are not
uncommon in Supply contracts generally, see Purchase and License
Agreement between VLSI Libraries and Eki Electonics, (1996)(“THIS
AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE . . . INTERPRETED BY ANY TRADE
USAGE OR PRIOR COURSE OF DEALING NOT MADE A PART OF
THIS AGREEMENT BY ITS EXPRESS TERMS”); Purchase agreement
between Gillette Co. and 123 Systems (2008) at Cl. 12.4.2 (“[N]o trade
usage shall be used to explain . . . this AGREEMENT even if either or
both PARTIES were aware or should have been aware of such trade
usage”); Development and Product Supply Agreement (2000) between S3
Inc and Intellon Corp. cl 7.1 (“ This Agreement shall not be . . .
interpreted by any trade usage or prior course of dealing not made a part
of this Agreement by its express terms.”); Master Supply Agreement
between Berkeley Heartlab Inc. and Diadexus, Inc (April 1, 2009) (“No
trade customs, courses of dealing or courses of performance by the
parties shall be relevant to . . . explain any term(s) used in this
Agreement.”)
lxxxiii Target Contract, supra note 80 at Cl 1 (“Any forecasts, commitments,
projections, representation about quantities to be purchased or other
estimates provided to Vendor are for planning purposes only and shall
not be binding upon Purchaser, and Purchaser shall not be liable for any
amounts incurred by Vendor in reliance on such estimates.”)
lxxxiv See e.g., Burlington Coat Factory, Express Terms and Conditions,
supra note 79 at Cl 1(“Time of delivery is hereby made of the essence”).
lxxxv See supra text accompanying nn 135.
lxxxvi See e.g., Kohl’s Terms and Conditions, supra note 80 at Cl 2 (“Seller
hereby waives any right to cure improper tender which might otherwise
be available under law”).
lxxxvii Id. at Cl 21 Courts differ in their treatment of no oral modification
clauses. See e.g., A. Sethi, D. Carson, & B. Whitlock, Boilerplate Provisions,
44 TEX. J. BUS. L., 153, 159 (2012) (noting the inconsistent positions taken
by Texas state courts with respect to clauses limiting modification to
written amendments).
lxxxviii Courts approaches to enforcing these clauses vary both across and
even within jurisdictions. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New
Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1507-1508 (2010)
(noting that merger and integration clauses are “accorded nearly
conclusive deference by the New York courts,” while in California, they
are “not conclusive but rather considered along with other evidence of
contract integration,” and “even if an integration clause is present and
respected regarding the original terms of the contract, California
recognizes relatively easy modification by course of dealing among the
lxxxii
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parties.”); Schwartz & Scott, Limits, supra note 76, at n. 94 nn94 (citing
cases that illustrate that courts’ attitudes towards merger clauses and
integration clauses vary widely and that such provisions are not
automatically enforced without question).
lxxxix U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt 4.
xc Id.
xci See e.g., Master Sales Agreement between Telecommunication
Systems, Inc and Vonage Network Inc., (2006) Cl. 14 (providing for
arbitration and noting that the “arbitrator’s award shall adhere to the
plain meaning of this Agreement and to applicable law.”); Supply
Agreement between Akorn Inc. and Novadaq Technologies (2002) Cl.
12.9 (providing for arbitration and directing that “arbitrator(s) shall apply
first the plain meaning of this Agreement, but in matters not fairly
provided for in this Agreement, shall apply the substantive law of the
State of Illinois.”). Such “plain meaning” provisions can also be found in
smaller contracts, see e.g., Growfoo Vendor Agreement, (2012) (providing
for arbitration and requiring that “The arbitrator's decision shall follow
the plain meaning of the relevant documents and shall be final and
binding.”); Planters Rural Telephone Cooperative, Service Terms and
Conditions
of
Service,
www.planters.net/docs/service_terms_conditions.pdf(same), and are
quite common in website statements of their terms and conditions of use.
xcii See SmartMeter Program Upgrade Supply agreement with Pacific Gas
and Electric (“This preamble is intended to provide a general
introduction to the Agreement. It is not intended to alter the plain
meaning of the Agreement or to expand the scope of the Parties’ express
obligations under it. However, to the extent the terms and conditions of
the Agreement do not address a particular circumstance or are otherwise
unclear or ambiguous, such terms and conditions are to be interpreted
and construed so as to give full effect to the provisions of this
preamble.“); Master Services Agreement by and Between ACI World
Wide and International Machines (same). One lawyer interviewed about
this clause noted that his firm had dropped it in IT outsourcing contracts
because it was making preambles too difficult to agree on.
xciii Smartmeter Agreement supra note 92 at Cl. 1.2
xciv
See e.g. The Miniature Garden Shoppe, General Terms and
Conditions,
http://www.miniaturegardenshoppe.com/termsandconditions.html
(“This agreement may not be explained or supplemented by any prior
course of dealings or trade by custom or usage.”); Hauser Packaging,
Terms and Conditions, www.hauserpack.com, (“Trade usage shall
neither be applicable nor relevant to this agreement, nor be used in any
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manner whatsoever to explain, qualify or supplement any of the
provisions hereof,” and that “In the event of any ambiguity or
inconsistency in these terms and conditions of sale, said terms shall be
given their literal or intended meaning and will not be strictly construed
against or to the detriment of the seller.”); Consolidated Electrical
Distributors, Terms and Conditions (“Any representation, promise,
course of dealing or trade usage not contained or referred to herein will
not be binding on Seller. No modification, amendment, rescission, waiver
or other change shall be binding on Seller unless assented to in writing by
Seller’s authorized representative.”); Noble Polymers, LLC Standard
Terms and Conditions of Sale (“Prior courses of dealing, trade usage and
verbal agreements not reduced to a writing signed by Seller, to the extent
they differ from, modify, add to or detract from the contract, shall not be
binding on Seller.”)
xcv Most of these systems opted for formalistic approaches long before the
Code was adopted so cannot properly be viewed as a reaction to it.
xcvi STATE OF NEW YORK, LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERIAL CODE, 23 (1954).
xcvii Id. at 25.
xcviii Id. at 29.
xcix Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457 (2009).
c Miller, Bargains Bicoastal, supra note 88 at 1478.
ci Stuart Popham, The View of European Business: Survey Results
(Clifford Chance 2008) at 6.
cii International Association of Contract and Commercial Managers, 2012
Top Terms in Negotiation, at 11,12 (noting that the importance attached
to these provisions might be due to “the tendency of courts – and in
particular regulatory authorities – to view any communication (including
social media) as relevant to investigations has impacted sensitivity in this
area. “)
ciii See Bernstein, Trade Usage, supra note 72 (exploring the ways that the
Code’s interpretive approach induces parties to fortify their contracts
with terms that attempt to constrain the courts recourse to contextual
considerations in the event of a dispute).
civ See Avery Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004).
cv See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 59 (1993).
cvi See supra note __and accompanying text, See also, Liebert
eProcurement Vendor Guide at 9 (Liebert provides suppliers with data
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on historical forecasts and usage, as well a current forecasts on a weekly
basis, but noting that “it is not a commitment by Liebert to purchase”);
OshKosh, Commercial Terms and Conditions: Commercial Purchase
Orders, (2013) Cl 2 (“From time to time, Buyer may, in its sole discretion,
deliver non-binding 52-week forecasts to Supplier. Notwithstanding any
such forecast delivered by Buyer, all purchases of Products shall be
governed by this Purchase Order and Supplier agrees that any such
forecast is intended solely to assist in planning Buyer’s production
schedules and is not a commitment to purchase any minimum volume of
Products from Supplier”).
cvii Value creating extralegal promises are not uncommon in commercial
relationships. See Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States
Versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33,
62-63 (1993) (discussing the efficient extralegal promises made by the
United Shoe Machine Company to its shoe machine lessees); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law In a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765. 1790-1794 (1996)
(providing additional examples of value creating extralegal promises in
computer software and commodities sales).
cviii See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT
LAW, (FORTHCOMING) at 13 (observing that commentators who report the
“birth of neo-formalism in contract law usually point to the work of only
three scholars: Lisa Bernstein, Alan Schwartz, and Robert Scott”)
cix Schwartz and Scott, supra note __at __.”
cx Schwartz and Scott assume that when contextualism is selected, a party
disadvantaged by the private-language meaning of a term, will only
engage in ex-post interpretation related strategic behavior in the rare case
where a contracts plain meaning (or one of a relatively small number of
plain meanings it might be viewed to reference) by mere happenstance
turn out to favor the position he wants to espouse ex-post.
cxi Bernstein, Trade Usage, supra note 72 at __.
cxii See Schwartz and Scott, Limits, supra note 76, and Bernstein, Trade
usage, supra note 72 (exploring the many barriers to effectively opting out
of the Code’s contextualized adjudicative approach).
cxiii See e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, [book] Cf. STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS
OF CONTRACTS INTERPRETATION, (OXFORD, 2009) (presenting the
interpretive theory known as objective contextualism).
cxiv Bernstein, Trade Usage, supra note 72 at __.
cxv See e.g., Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801
(D. Conn. 1970) (where the contract called for the delivery of 500 tons of
steel, the court permitted evidence in the form of testimony by the
defendants employee that there was a usage of trade whereby a fixed
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quantity term in a contract, meant an amount up to that quantity,
explaining that such a usage did not contradict the term, and that
summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.); HeggbladeMarguleas-Tenaco v. Sunshine Biscuit, 59 Cal. App. 3d 948 (Cal. App. 5th
Dist. 1976) (where a contract had a fixed quantity provision that was held
not to contradict a usage proffered by the plaintiff seller who drafted the
contract that all stated quantities were mere estimates); Crest Ridge Constr.
Group v. Newcourt Inc., 78 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. Tex. 1996)(contract term
“subject to credit department approval,” was held not to contradict a
usage giving 45 day credit terms.)
cxvi Campbell Farms v. Wald, 578 N.W. 2d 96(1998)
cxvii American Machine v. Strite Anderson, 597 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
cxviii See Bernstein, Trade Usage, supra note 72.
cxix See Weiner-Katz, supra note 105 (noting that when firms do not have
effective internal controls over the actions of their employees, but feel
their legal staffs adequately represent their interests, they will prefer
relatively formalist types of contract interpretation).
cxx U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2010).
cxxi In practice, however, large firms dealing with especially important
suppliers (or suppliers with a great deal of bargaining power) will enter
into specially negotiated transactions with different terms. These are
referred to as exempt transactions.
cxxii Dollar General, Master Supply Agreement, cl. 4.1.
cxxiii When these opt outs are included by buyers they are designed to
prevent the acceptance of additional or different terms that might arise
when a supplier sends a confirmatory memoranda prior to shipment that
the buyer does not object to. Conversely, when used by sellers, they
guard against the legal consequences that would otherwise flow from the
sellers’ employees shipping against a purchase order with additional or
conflicting terms.
cxxiv For example, many large firms produce internal policy manuals that
set out who may sign particular types of contracts, the maximum length
of commitments and/or the total value of commitments certain
employees can make, and many other details about the constrained menu
of provisions that managers at different levels may include in the
agreements they sign. These internal policy documents also commonly
set out the authority or lack thereof of particular employees to approve
change orders and alterations of existing agreements. In firms that use
primarily master agreements, similar constraints are placed on managers
charged with negotiating and drafting service level agreements.
cxxv footnote on cure see seans earlier memo
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See IACCM, Contract Briefing Template (Version 7 July 2011) at 1
Id.
cxxviii Id.
cxxix Id. The template includes: “Goals of the Customer (summarise the
outcomes sought from this deal). . . Goals of supplier (summarise the
outcomes sought from this deal) . . . Scope-(what is in, anything specific
that is out (but could be a source of confusion) . . . Beneficiaries (ie who is
eligible to participate) . . . Performance measures/KPIs (including any
specific obligations re: on-going price reductions, performance
improvements). . .Consequences of non-performance (in particular areas
such as LDs). . .Change procedures (and major sources of anticipated
change). . . Review, reporting communication procedures (internal and
external) . . . Responsibilities of Customer [including contract page
number,
name
of
lead
person,
and
date
for
performance]. . .Responsibilities of the Supplier. . .Active Terms
[including
page
number,
lead
person,
and
date
for
performance]. .
.Milestones [same]. . .Time-bound activities and
responsibilities [same]. . .Risks (noted during the bid and negotiation
phase [including ‘mitigation/management/allocation assumed when
contract signed’] . . . Opportunities noted during bid negotiation phase
[and designations for follow through] . . . Useful information discovered
concerning customer/supplier organization and personalities, relevant to
managing the contract. . Governance Requirements [including manager
names and committee names]. .Other relevant information we already
obtained that will help with interpretation of the contract (e.g. Legal
Advice). . .[and] Subcontract details.”)
cxxx IACCM, The State of Sales Contract Management (2011) at 9-10
cxxxi mel steve burton cited in ss
cxxxii Even if the contract is clear, evidence of these usages will be
admissible to supplement or explain the written terms, as under the Code,
trade usages are not parol evidence.
cxxxiii Target, supra note 80, at cl. 13.
cxxxiv Gilson, et. al, supra note 3. In the modern economy many of the
even the most straightforward sales transactions have a contracting for
innovation component, reflected in the supply chain philosophy of
“continuous improvement,” in which vendor and supplies work
together to achieve gains “in the form of improved product quality,
delivery, part pricing and service.” National Instruments, NI Supplier
Handbook at 5, available online at
http://www.ni.com/pdf/misc/en/supplier_handbook.pdf (visited June 28,
2013).
cxxxv Gilson, et al., supra note 3, at 435.
cxxvi

cxxvii
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Id.
Id. at 492.
cxxxviii Jennejohn, supra note 68, at 179.
cxxxix Id. at 207.
cxl Id. at 179.
cxli These audit provisions tend to be quite broad and give the buyer the
right to inspect the sellers plant, its books and records, its quality control
documentation and the like, information that, for the most part, firms do
not usually have access to unless they file a suit for breach and obtain the
right to conduct discovery. Like the right to demand root cause analysis,
see infra note __ this provision enables the seller to better understand
both whether certain types of breaches have occurred (such as not
meeting most favored nation pricing provisions), and why, without the
need to file a lawsuit, thereby opening the door (though by no means
ensuring) that corrective actions can be taken. These types of provisions
also help transactors figure out whether or not a bad outcome is due to
opportunism or inadvertent error; they thereby make it less likely that
cooperative contracting relationships (once established) will break down.
cxxxvi

cxxxvii

“Root cause analysis ”is a semi-structured method of determining the
cause of a problem in performance. The information generated by this
process can be used to maintain cooperation by helping a firm figure out
whether a bad outcome should be classified as an act of deliberate
defection, or chalked up to an inadvertent mistake, the actions of a rouge
agent, or a problem in the seller’s production process that it can commit
to change. This process is especially important in transactions between
entities who have so many agents involved in the execution of a single
contract that an entity’s intent to cooperate or defect cannot be discerned
merely by looking at outcomes or through one entities understanding of
the other (as is possible in smaller, more personal contracting
relationships).
cxlii

cxliii

See Kadens, supra note 16 at __.
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